ABSTRACT In order to satisfy the various requirements of future network services, 5G wireless network is proposed and becoming a hot topic in academic and industrial field. Location-based services are widely used with the development of wireless communication and mobile Internet technology. A number of popular spatial-temporal cloaking technologies have been proposed, and the number of users in an anonymizing spatial region (ASR) is uncontrollable. This paper, based on the semi-trusted server architecture proposes a location cloaking algorithm (LCA) based on combinatorial optimization. First, the semi-trusted server architecture divides the information of mobile users into three parts, so adversaries are unable to obtain the location and identity at the same time, then utilize the spatial k-anonymity algorithm LCA to hide the real locations of user, which controls the number of real users to around k in the anonymous result sets (Aset), so that both the number of users in ASR and the area of ASR are minimized, thereby improving query precision and decreasing the resources consumption. Finally, complete further improvement that the location is distinguishable in ASR and the query contents are diverse in Aset. Simulations show that the LCA performs well on cloaking success rate, query precision, and resources saving.
I. INTRODUCTION
The 5G wireless network is a new generation of mobile communication systems, which is geared towards the mobile communication needs after 2020 [1] . According to the laws of mobile communication development, 5G will possess ultrahigh frequency spectrum utilization efficiency [2] and energy efficiency, and will improve a magnitude or higher than 4G in the aspect of transmission rate, transmission delay and utilization rate of resources and so on [3] - [5] . The vigorous development of the mobile Internet is the main driving force of 5G mobile communication. 5G will be closely combined with other wireless mobile communication technologies, and constitute a new generation of ubiquitous mobile information network, to meet the increasing demand of mobile Internet traffic.
With the evolution of 5G network architecture, its security mechanism will also change accordingly. According to main performance requirement of 5G networks, deploying small-cell base stations in 5G wireless networks has been proposed [6] , which is an emerging technology to meet the demand of high data rate transmission for a growing number of heterogeneous devices [7] - [9] . Moreover, massive multiple-input multi-output antenna and millimeter wave wireless transmission technologies further reduce the wireless transmission distance in 5G wireless communication systems [10] , [11] . So, the density of base stations will be higher, leading to high accuracy of positioning technology [12] , [16] , and it is also convenient for adversary to speculate the location of users.
Nowadays, mobile devices (e.g. smart phone and tablets) have powerful capacity of computation and storage, and combining with positioning technology, they can request the relevant services about LBS anytime and anywhere [13] . Location-based Services (LBSs) have become an important part of the future mobile Internet environment.
LBS provide convenience to users in 5G wireless networks, at the same time, also brings risks of location privacy leakage [14] , [15] . Users must send their current locations to the LBS providers when they enjoy location-based services. The adversary might listen to the communication channel between a user and a LBS provider, or might extract records from an LBS provider stealthily. As Small-Cell Base Stations dramatically reduce the cell coverage degree [17] , the knowledge of the cell a mobile user communicates to can easily reveal valuable information about the user's location [18] . According to the data collected, the adversary can link the records with the identity of an actual user and they can even infer the user's living habits and state of health, etc., thereby threatening users' safety [19] , [20] . In such cases, it is particularly important to protect the users' location privacy.
Research of location privacy protection has attracted extensive attention of academia. Researchers mainly focus on privacy protection cloaking algorithm, location privacy protection system architecture, data transmission and query, etc. The existing location privacy protection technologies are divided into the following categories [21] , [22] :
(1) Regulatory approaches [23] : Approaches related to making rules, regulations, and legislations to protect privacy through formulating strict rules and regulations of network use, improving the awareness of network security and Internet access specification.
(2) Privacy policy based approaches: Refer to mechanisms that can prohibit certain misuse of location data. E.g., location privacy protection method based on information retrieval [24] , users can retrieve any data on the untrusted server and not expose the retrieved data information.
(3) Anonymity based approaches [25] , [26] : users' identities from their location information. E.g., a user's identity may be replaced with pseudonyms [27] . A trusted middleware is utilized to produce fake information of a user to replace real information when the user requests LBS services, and send it to the LBS provider to protect user's location privacy.
(4) Encryption based approaches [28] : Before a user sends the LBS request, the content of request is encrypted, and then the LBS provider decrypts the information received. The anonymity intensity of this kind of methods is high and they will not excessively expose the POI (point of interest) of LBS database. The drawback of this approach is that the communication and computation costs are very high, and the delay of service is serious.
(5) Obfuscation based approaches [29] , [30] : Downgrades the quality of users' location information to protect location privacy. E.g., spatial cloaking technique that enlarges the location point of user to a region called ASR that contains the location of user [31] , where the typical k-anonymity technique [33] is usually used. Then the trusted third party sends the ASR to LBS providers to complete LBS query. Location cloaking is one of the most commonly used methods for location privacy protection.
Next, we will detail some classic algorithms of location privacy protection.
A. ENCRYPTION BASED APPROACHES
To protect users' location privacy, Sergio Mascetti et al. put forward a method based on encryption technology to protect users' location privacy [34] . In proximity services, a user will be informed when a friend comes near him, which does not need to reveal personal current location to LBS providers. In the process, a user shares a password with friends.
B. ANONYMITY BASED APPROACHES
Beresford and Stajano proposed an innovative concept called mix zone based on pseudonyms [35] . The mix zone is used to provide a spatial region in which a user may cross paths with other users. This method relies on a set of predefined spatial regions for pseudonym exchange. After a user sends a query, he continuously exchanges his pseudonym according to specified rules with other users, which makes it hard to confirm a user's real path.
In Bettini et al.'s approach [36] , they defined locationbased quasi-identifiers. Basing on the concept of historical k-anonymity, they proposed a formal framework to see the potential risk of location information leading to the identity disclose.
H. Kido et al. proposed a dummy location based approach to protect location privacy [37] , in which dummy location data is generated and mixed with real location data, so that it is difficult for the adversaries and LBS providers to differentiate between them.
C. OBFUSCATION BASED APPROACHES
The work proposed by Gruteser and Grunwald is the first to introduce a spatial cloaking technique called Interval Cloak [38] . It combines with k-anonymity technique. After a user sends LBS requests, the trusted third party recursively searches the entire space based on a quad-tree approach, until the number of user fits in a quadrant where k-anonymity is satisfied. It then sends the user's requests, their ASR and all the user's information in the corresponding ASR to the LBS provider. The purpose of k-anonymity is that an adversary can identify a user that issues a request with the probability not exceeding 1/k. But the ASR is relatively large, which will affect the query precision of LBS providers.
Mohamed F. Mokbel et al. proposed a novel model called New Casper [39] . This model also uses a quad-tree to recursively partition the entire space, and each partitioned quadrilateral is a node of the quad-tree. In the cloaking process, start from the user's current cell to find the ASR that meets the condition of anonymity according to the index of quad-tree. Moreover, the users themselves can decide the anonymous degree k and anonymous region Amin (Amin is the lower limit of ASR as user predefines, which ensures the ASR is a region rather than the user's location). The speed of this method is relatively faster, but the increase of ASR is reduplicated, which will directly cause the loss of query precision.
Meanwhile, the number of users also changes greatly, and if user number is superabundant, the quality of service will be degraded. Zheng et al. [50] proposed a new cloaking approach based on New Casper model, we can call it CAPLP. The basic idea of this approach is to select a sub-area(namely, is a node of quad-tree) from the generated cloaking areas as user's location. The sub-area contains the user's real location randomly.
A feeling based approach is proposed by Xu and Cai [31] . If a user sends a LBS request, his privacy requirement is defined through specifying a public region. The popularity of public region will be computed through an entropy based approach that considers the users and footprints of region. The location information of a user may be disclosed in the form of a cloaking box, only if the popularity of disclosed cloaking box is equal to or greater than the pre-specified public region. Later, T. Xu and Y. Cai further proposed a Popular Trajectory that is related to the temporal and spatial aspects of a mobile user, and proposed a quad-tree based algorithm to select cloaking sets and compute cloaking boxes. In addition, a entropy based metric was proposed to measure the location privacy.
Throughout the development of location privacy protection, the precision of location information cause conflict between privacy protection and quality of query service, which is the intrinsic characteristic of LBS. So, balancing the relationship between privacy safety and quality of service has become an important issue in the study of LBS.
This paper analyzes and summarizes the existing location privacy protection systems and anonymous algorithms, then proposes a new location cloaking algorithm based on combinatorial optimization (LCA) in LBS systems, to protect users' location privacy in 5G. Location privacy is of grave concern to association and it is very important to prevent attackers from acquiring location information while maintaining a certain level of quality of services (QoS) [32] for each mobile user. The main contributions are as follows:
(1) This paper proposes a location cloaking method which is the first one exploiting combinatorial optimization.
(2) Optimal solutions for resource utilization and query precision are achieved and the user's anonymity is guaranteed.
(3) The success rate of anonymity algorithm is higher than classic space cloaking algorithms.
(4) Achieve that the location is distinguishable and the contents of query are various, to avoid the consistency attacks and improve the degree of privacy protect.
The LCA algorithms proposed in this paper aims to find an optimal balancing point which takes both privacy protection and quality of query service into consideration to better performance. To create a better environment of safe communication for the upcoming 5G era.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, introduce the related work that includes some detailed introductions about classic algorithms. The LCA algorithm is described in Section 3. The performance evaluation is implemented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes this paper and lists future work.
II. PREPARATION WORK
This section gives insight into combinatorial optimization for better understanding of the LCA algorithm, introduces a kind of semi-trusted server architecture and describes some attack models.
A. COMBINATORIAL OPTIMIZATION
To better solve the conflict between location privacy safety and quality of service, this paper exploits the concept of combination optimization.
Combinatorial Optimization [40] refers to finding an optimal object from a finite set of objects. In many such problems, exhaustive search is not feasible. It operates on the domain of those optimization problems, in which the set of feasible solutions is discrete or can be reduced to discrete.
The goal of combinatorial optimization is to find the optimal sequence arrangement, grouping and filter, etc.
The formulation of combinatorial optimization is as follows:
Where f (x) is the objective function and g(x) is the constraint function, while x is the decision variable, and D represents a set of finite points.
A problem of combinatorial optimization can be represented by three parameters (D, F, f ), where D represents the definitional domain of decision variable, F is the domain of feasible solution that meets F = {x|x ∈ D, g(x) ≥ 0. Any one element in F is a feasible solution of the problem. The f represents the objective function, if the feasible solution x * satisfies f (x * ) = min {f (x) | x ∈ F}, it is known as the optimal solution.
The characteristics of combinatorial optimization are as follows:
(1) The number of points is finite in the set of feasible solution.
(2) If the feasible solution exists, the optimal solution must exist.
A classic algorithm that solves the problem of combinatorial optimization is the simulated annealing algorithm. The following is the description of simulated annealing algorithm.
Simulated annealing algorithm [41] , [42] derived from the principle of solid annealing, the solid heated to fully high, let its slowly cooling, heating, solid internal particle with temperature rise into disordered shape state, the internal energy increases, and slowly cooling particles gradually orderly, and in each temperature are to reach an equilibrium state, and the last in the room temperature reaches ground state, internal energy is reduced to a minimum. VOLUME 4, 2016 According to Metropolis criterion, particle in temperature T , when the probability of the equilibrium is e− E/(kT ), where E is the internal energy when the temperature T , E for the amount of change, k is the Boltzmann constant. Simulated annealing with solid combinatorial optimization problem, the internal energy E simulation for the objective function value f , temperature T evolution into control parameter t, are solutions of combinatorial optimization problems of simulated annealing algorithm: the initial solution i and control parameter initial t start, on the current solution repeat, ''produce data processing to calculate target function difference -to accept or to reject,'' the iteration, and gradually decay t value, the algorithm is terminated from the current approximate solution is the optimal solution, which is based on the Monte Carlo Diego's iteration, a Heuristic Solution of the random search process.
Annealing process consists by cooling schedule (Cooling Schedule) control, including the control parameters of the initial t and its attenuation factor t, at every t value the iteration number L and stop condition S.
B. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
At present, the mainstream architectures of privacy protection include the following three types [43] - [45] : (1) Non-cooperative Architecture [46] , every mobile user serves as an independent node and depend on their own position and utilize the strong computing power and storage capacity of mobile devices to protect personal location privacy by generating fake position coordinates or obfuscating location coordinates; (2) Peer-to-Peer Architecture [47] - [49] , the mobile users form an Ad Hoc network. When a user sends a LBS query request, the user find the appropriate and trusted users to cooperate with to conceal the query user's precise location in the network, thereby protecting the user's location privacy; (3) Trusted Third Party Architecture. This paper adopts the popular Trusted Third Party Architecture.
This paper proposes a kind of semi-trusted server architecture, which is made up of mobile users, a location anonymity server (Anonymizer), a Certificate Authority (CA) and some LBS providers. The architecture and message flow are shown in Fig. 1 .
1) CA (CERTIFICATE AUTHORITY)
As commonly assumed in many networks, we consider an online Certification Authority (CA) run by an independent trusted third party. Every mobile user registers with the CA, and the CA will send a pseudonym and a key to the user and LBS providers. So, CA is the only party who knows the identity of user, and it also knows the mapping between real identity and pseudonyms.
2) ANONYMIZER
It receives accurate locations of mobile users, and performs location cloaking, then transmits the result of cloaking to a LBS provider. The location anonymizer not only saves the location privacy parameters of each user, but also saves the updated position information. Location cloaking algorithms need to refer to the geographical location of mobile users in the region, so users must update their location information at any moment to ensure the precision of location based services. Anonymizer only knows the accurate locations of users and pseudonyms, but doesn't know the identity of users and the content of query. Even though the anonymizer is untrusted, it is still impossible for the attacker to reveal the real source of user locations when it is compromised and monitored by attackers.
When a user needs a location service, it executes the process in Fig. 1 to obtain a location service.
Firstly, the mobile user encrypts the content of request by U key that CA allocates, and sends a request of location to the anonymizer. The request contains the user's current pseudonym U pseu , the content of request Qr encry and the accurate location p of the user, where the pseudonym and content of request are encrypted.
Then, anonymizer performs a spatio-temporal cloaking algorithm to obtain the ASR and Aset, and sends the result to the LBS provider. The result includes the user's current pseudonym U pseu , the content of request Qr encry , ASR and Aset, where the pseudonym and the content of request are encrypted.
Finally, LBS providers decrypt the content of request by U key , search the result of request and send the result to Anonymizer. Anonymizer will find the correct POIs in the result by the accurate location of user, and transmits the POIs to the mobile user.
So, the architecture can achieve that the knowledge of the privacy information is separately distributed to the location anonymizer, the CA, and the LBS providers, respectively. Each party only has partial knowledge: the location anonymizer only knows pseudonyms and locations, the CA only knows the mapping between the real identity, users' pseudonyms and key, while the LBS provider only knows the pseudonyms, cloaking location and content of query. Attackers are unable to learn a user's location information without integrating all the knowledge. Therefore, compromising either party of our system does not reveal privacy.
In 5G networks, the number of base stations will be much more than in 3G/4G networks, and the data flow will be greatly increased. So, the semi-trusted server architecture will become more popular.
C. ATTACK MODELS
As described above, the architecture can prevent that the adversaries steal data from server to reveal location privacy of users. However, it is difficult for adversaries to steal the data of three parts at the same time. Next, we will discuss several kinds of attacks and explain how they relate to our proposed algorithm.
1) SEMANTIC INFORMATION ATTACKS
The adversaries can obtain the cloaking location information of mobile users, and exclude some irrelevant locations with background knowledge of geographical location. Therefore, adversaries infer the sensitive location of users. While the proposed architecture can encrypt content of query and disperse the information of users.
2) TIMING ATTACKS
Another set of attacks might use timing information if LBS providers can observe the traffic close to the originating user. So, the location privacy of the user is very likely compromised. But, LBS providers don't know the real identity of users in our architecture.
3) REGIONAL CENTER/ BOUNDARY ATTACK
Due to the characteristics of the anonymous region generation algorithm, the probability is high that real locations of users exist in center and boundary. Once the adversaries know the rule of cloaking algorithms, they will focus on the center and boundary to attack. But, the LCA algorithm depends on the distribution of users, so real locations of users are random in ASR and hard to reveal.
The proposed architecture performs well on privacy protection when facing abovementioned mainstream attack models. Fig. 2 illustrates a scenario of a 5G network consisting of 8 femtocells and one macrocell. The output of an association algorithm is depicted in the figure, where each mobile is connected to a base station. Each femtocell has the maximum capacity and its coverage is small. If an attacker knows that at specific time a mobile user connects to one of the femtocells (e.g. Cell1), the attacker can determine the geographical location of the mobile user with high precision.
III. ALGORITHM DESIGN
Moreover, if a user moves for trans-regional, for example a user A moves from Cell1 to Cell2, the user can connect both Cell1 and Cell2. Once the adversary knows the connections in femtocell Cell1 and Cell2, the adversary can determine the location of shaded mobile user A with even higher accuracy.
This paper addresses the issue by first establishing a kind of semi-trusted server architecture to disperse the information of mobile users, so adversaries are unable to obtain the location and identity at the same time. Then, utilize the spatial k-anonymity algorithm LCA to hide the real user. Even though adversaries know a mobile user's connection to a specific femtocell, they still can't distinguish the real query user in all connected users. The following is a detailed description of the algorithm LCA.
A. DEFINITIONS
To better describe the cloaking process of our algorithm, some basic concepts and parameters are defined below.
Definition 1: A LBS request Q is a 5-tuple
Where uid is the identity of a user; p = (longitude, latitude) represents the current coordinates of user that sends Q; t records the time when user sends Q; k represents the level of anonymity that user predefines; Amin is the lower limit of ASR that user requires; qr represents the query content of user. In all parameters, uid is input when the user registers, pand tare automatically obtained by mobile devices, while others are required by the user. k and Amin are critical factors that influence the anonymity result.
Definition 2: a QoS measurement M is regarded as the overall measurement of resource utilization and query precision.
Where Rp represents the measure of resource utilization, when Unum is close to k, the Rp is smaller, the VOLUME 4, 2016 resource utilization is higher. (The resource includes computation and transmission consumption of LBS servers and the anonymizer).
Qp is the measure of query precision (The smaller ASR is, the higher the query precision is).
The following is the definitional domain of the variables.
Uset is the set of total users. Anum is the number of the grid cells which are searched in the location cloaking process.
Unum records the number of users in the Anum grid cells. Namely, those users exist in the spatial region that is consisted of Anum grid cells.
In the process of cloaking, if the number of users in ASR is too many, it will burden the server and cause the waste of resources. On the contrary, if there are fewer users, the anonymity process might fail. The resource will be well utilized if the number of users is close to k, and a smaller ASR will help to improve the query precision. M is the measurement of the quality of service (QoS) of the LCA algorithm. The smaller M is, the higher the QoS is.
According to formulation (4)- (7), the definitional domain of M is a set that is made up of finite points (Anum, Unum). Anum and Unum influence each other, and their changes are irregular as shown in Table 1 . A portfolio can surely be found.
When the number of users is insufficient, the anonymizer will add some fake users to complete the cloaking. However, too many fake users might lead to real users' information leakage. The purpose of ε is to restrict the number of fake users, and the anonymizer will return failure if formula (7) does not hold.
Through the above definitions and instructions, a combination of Anum and Unum (a t , u t ) can surely be found that minimize the M according to Table I . The minimal M indicates that overall, resource utilization and query precision achieves optimality, namely the QoS of LCA algorithm achieves optimality.
B. THE STORAGE STRUCTURE OF USER DATA
The LCA algorithm partitions the cellular network into grids. As shown in Fig. 2 , every grid covers three cells, which can ensure the mobile users connect different small-cell base stations in ASR.
The user data is stored in a grid structure. The anonymizer divides the entire space region into a grid of α × β (α and β are defined by the system), each grid cell is expressed as (Cellid, Num), where Cellid is the identity of the grid cell and Num represents the number of users in the current grid cell. The personal information of each user that sends LBS request is stored in database as Fig. 3 . After a user sends the LBS request Q, the anonymizer will store its id, location and grid cell id, etc. If this user terminates current service, his personal information will be deleted, at the same time, the anonymizer will also decrease the number of user in the grid cell.
C. ALGORITHM DESCRIPTION
The LCA algorithm aims to minimize the area of ASR while keep the number of users in ASR close to k, which will decrease resource consumption and improve query precision. Moreover, select the users that their distance is far and appropriately increase the contents of query when necessary, which further improve the location privacy degree. Thus, the QoS and the location security of LBS will get better in 5G wireless networks.
Futhermore, the addition of appropriate fake users is critical to the success rate of cloaking and will improve the algorithm efficiency.
1) THE PROCESS OF ACHIEVING ASR
The algorithm starts with C i = ∅, and is detailed as the following steps.
Step 1: A user sends a LBS request Q to the anonymizer, the anonymizer checks the current grid cell of the user. If the number of user Num is greater than or equal to k and the area of grid cell is greater than or equal to Amin (the anonymity requirement), take the current grid cell as the ASR, record the point (Anum, Unum) in C i , and jump to Step 3. Otherwise, go to Step 2.
Step 2: Merge the current grid cell to its adjacent row or column with the longest length and the most users. Recalculate Anum and Unum in the merged cell, record the point (Anum, Unum) in C i . If the merged cell meets the anonymity requirement, it is taken as the ASR, and jump to Step 3. Otherwise, repeat Step 2 until an appropriate ASR is computed or the ASR is greater than or equal to the predefined upper bound of cloaking region Amax. Fig. 4 shows the iterative cloaking process when it continually fails to find an appropriate ASR. Step 3: Choose a point (Anum, Unum) that minimizes M from C i . If Unum/k < ε, remove the point from C i , and repeat Step 3. If Unum/k ≥ 1, Go to step 4. If ε ≤ Unum/ k < 1, which does not meet the condition of k-anonymity, the anonymizer adds u fake = (k − Unum) fake users to complete the cloaking, and go to Step 4.
Step 4: The Anum grid cells compose the ASR and the Unum users compose the anonymous set Aset (It contains LBS request qr of each user).
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo code of ASR acquisition in LCA algorithm.
The above steps are the acquisition process of ASR, and gain anonymous set Aset. However, if the query content of all users are similar or the lack of diversity in Aset, the adversary is able to easily infer the user's sensitive information (such as disease, etc.). And if the location distance of users is near in Aset, they may be displayed in the same area (such as hospital, etc.), which will reveal the user's sensitive position. So, the sensitive location information of query users easily suffers consistency attacks.
To avoid this kind of consistency attacks, the location of users should be distinguishable in the anonymous result, and the query contents should be diversified. 
2) THE PROCESS OF IDENTIFYING DISTINGUISHABLE LOCATION
The number of real users in the Aset can be higher than k. In order to further reduce the communication overhead and decrease the calculation consumption of LBS provider search, the appropriate k users are chosen in the Aset to compress anonymous result. And the selected k users should satisfy Kset is a set of k users, and Kset ∈ Aset, ∀i, j, u i and u j ∈ Kset, the sum of Distance(u i , u j ) is max.
This step ensures that the k users are located in scattered places. Thus it becomes difficult for an adversary to steal a user's sensitive position. a, b, c, d , e, f), and k = 3. The 3 users must be selected from Fig. 4(A) . Obviously, in Fig. 4(B) , the set {a, d, f} is the optimal solution, because the sum of their distance is largest. VOLUME 4, 2016 Thus the set {a, d, f} is sent to LBS provider as the anonymous result.
However, the computational work in finding k users such that the sum of each pair users' distance is the largest will be heavier when the number of users is large,. Therefore, the simulated annealing algorithm is utilized to find the approximate optimal solution (i.e., the k users that the sum of each pair users' distance is largest) as shown in the following definitions.
L(X ) is the sum of each pair users' distance, namely, is the objective function of simulated annealing algorithm.
X i represents a subset of Aset as the variable of L(X ). In addition, the number of users is always k, X i = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k , x i is a single user.
The formula (12) is used to calculate the sum of k users' distance. The purpose is to find the maximum of L(X ). Where, l(x i , x j ) represents the distance from user x i to user x j as showed in formula (13), x i (lat) and x i (lon) respectively represent the latitude and longitude of user x i .
The formula (14) is the limiting conditions of the objective function L(X ). Where, |Aset| records the number of users in Aset.
The following is the process description to select k users in Aset.
Firstly, select an initial solution X 0 , and calculate the total distance of k users in X 0 , and record the optimal solution
Otherwise, the optimal solution will accept X new at a probability p, to make X best = X new . The calculation formula of p is shown in (15) (16).
According to the above steps, regenerate X new and calculate the value of L(X new ) until the continuous five new solutions are not accepted.
Finally, the anonymous result only includes k users in any case. Whether the distance of every two location points is close or not can be known, therefore replacing one of them by another fake location where the frequency of users query is high and the number of users is large. 
Algorithm 2 Process For Finding k Users in the Aset
if dL > 0 9:
if c= random[0,1] < p 13:
X best = X new ; AcceptFlag = 0 14:
else
3) THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DIVERSE QUERY CONTENT
According to all the steps described above, the k users can be finally obtained in the anonymous result.
Compare the Jaccard similarity of each pair query contents to judge their difference. Define an overall similarity below a certain threshold λ which can be defined according to request. The formula (17) is utilized to calculate the Jaccard similarity of two query contents. The formula (18) defines an overall difference of all query contents diff. The formula (19) is defined as a limitation of diff.
To improve the diversity of query contents, modify the query contents of some irrelevant users to decrease the similarity of k query contents when diff ≥ λ. Thereby the final anonymous result, which includes the information and query contents of users, can be gained and is sent to the LBS provider.
The privacy protection can be enhanced more with no much overhead calculation consumption by utilizing the above steps.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION A. SIMULATION SETUP
The simulation environment is developed with Java 7.0, and runs on a PC with Intel Core i7-2600 CPU@3.40GHz, 8 GB Memory. The user data used in the experiments is generated by the Thomas Brinkhoff data generator [51] . A space with the area of 1000m × 1000m is divided into 40 × 40 grids in the simulations where 2000 users are randomly distributed. For performance comparison, the New Casper model and CAPLP are also simulated. The cloaking time, cloaking success rate, the area of ASR, resources consumption and privacy protection degree are chosen as the evaluation metrics.
The simulation parameters are listed in Table 2 . Define the constants such as Amin, Amax, etc. The value of Amin and Amax represent the restriction in the number of grid cell in the process that finds the required ASR. And the table also defines the change interval of k. B. CLOAKING TIME Fig. 6 depicts the cloaking time of the LCA, the New Casper model and CAPLP, the cloaking time increases ask changes from 5 to 55. The cloaking time is the time that is consumed from receiving a LBS request to the completion of cloaking (namely, get the ASR).
The main difference between the LCA and the New Casper model lies in the cell expanding and merging process. LCA expands grid cells linearly, while the New Casper model expands double grid cells in each round. So the cloaking speed of LCA is slower than the New Casper model, especially when k is becoming bigger. While the CAPLP needs to select a sub-area in a quad-tree structure, so drops the speed of cloaking.
When the number of users is more than k, Fig. 7 shows the change curve of time by simulated annealing algorithm to choose k users in Aset. The more the number of users is in Aset, the more the consumption of time is.
The dotted lines represent the comparison of using simulated annealing algorithm (LCAIMP) and using the method of traversal (ORIGINAL) to select k users in Aset when k =5. Obviously, the speed of LCAIMP is much faster than the ORIGINAL. The solid line represents the change of time when k = 6. Through the comparison of different parameters change, the LCAIMP has obvious advantage. Fig. 8 shows the comparison of cloaking success rate among the LCA, New Casper model and CAPLP. The cloaking success rate of New Casper model and CAPLP obviously drops with the increase of k, while the success rate of LCA drops slowly. The reason is that the ASR of the other two algorithms is easier to exceed the predefined Amax due to double grid cell expansion. In LCA, the grid cells of ASR grows more slowly, and moreover fake users insertion mechanism in LCA confines the area of ASR to a certain scale, which helps the anonymizer meet the LBS request of users with higher probability, and thereby provide better services for users. Especially, when the number of users is sparse, the advantage of LCA will be more obvious.
C. CLOAKING SUCCESS RATE
In addition, the cloaking success rate of LCA mainly depends on ε. Because ε restricts the proportion of fake users when it needs to add some fake users. LCA sets ε to be 0.7, namely the proportion of real users should be greater than or equal to 70%. The cloaking success rate can be improved by decreasing the value of ε, which enhances the flexibility of the LCA algorithm. Fig. 9 shows the comparison of areas of ASR in the three algorithms. The ASR replaces the real location of a user to complete LBS query, and the area of ASR directly affects the query precision of LBS providers. The smaller ASR is, the higher the query precision is. As shown in Fig. 9 , ASR of LCA is obviously smaller than that of the New Casper model, and the changing rate is smaller. Even though the ASR of CAPLP is smaller, but its ASR may not contain the real location of users, and the error of query will be bigger. Thus, the query precision of LCA is higher, and the users can enjoy more accurate location-based services. Fig. 10 depicts the comparison of resources consumption of three schemes. The resources consumption (The resources consumption includes query processing of LBS and networks traffic load) is determined by the number of users in anonymous result. Here, the UserNum is defined to represent the number of users in anonymous result. Bigger UserNum will burden the processors and the communication channels. So decreasing UserNum can avoid the waste of resources and speed up the response process, and hence improve the quality of service. As shown in Fig. 10 , CAPLP achieve the smallerUserNum at the expense of the query precision, LCA can obviously decrease the resources consumption compared with the New Casper model. 
D. AREA OF ASR

E. RESOURCES CONSUMPTION
F. PRIVACY PROTECTION DEGREE
In real life, a sensitive position may contain a large area. Though the distance is far between the two users, they can also exist in the same sensitive area. As shown in Fig. 11 , experiment many times and take the average. The locations of user a and b are different, but they are in a hospital that represents a sensitive area. Thus, the more the users are, the easier to leak privacy.
To prove the effectiveness of distinguishable location, a comparison is made as shown Fig. 12 . Define the privacy protection degree:
User area k Where User area represents the number of users that exist in the same area, namely, ∀u i , u j existinansamearea, u i and u j ∈ User area .
And k is the number of users in the anonymous result. The less PPD is, the higher the privacy protection degree is, because fewer users exist in same area. In the figure, privacy protection degree of LCA is better as the distance between every two users is larger. And, the diversity of query contents is achieved to better protect the sensitive location information of users. Firstly, define a QCD to measure the privacy degree, namely,
QCD =
Query num k Where Query num records the kind of users' query content, and k is the number of user in the anonymous result. The greater the value of QCD is, the more kinds of users' query contents are. Fig. 13 shows the comparison of QCD in the three algorithms. Obviously, the query contents of LCA is more abundant, so its effectiveness of privacy protection is better. From what has been discussed above, The LCA algorithm can better achieve the differentiation of locations and the diversity of query contents thereby avoiding consistency attack, improving the privacy protection degree and protecting the sensitive location information of users.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The users' location privacy is paid more attention when requesting the LBS applications. Especially for the upcoming 5G wireless networks, privacy has become a problem demanding prompt solution. The location cloaking algorithm based on combinatorial optimization in location based services (LCA) is proposed, which introduces the concept of combinatorial optimization to keep the number of real users in the anonymous result sets close to k. Compared with existing anonymous algorithms, LCA decreases the area of ASR and resources consumption, and improves the cloaking success rate and privacy protection degree when there are few users in the region, which improves the quality of service.
With the advent of the era of big data, and the strong traffic transport capacity of 5G will produce huge data, the location privacy leakage in big data scenarios becomes a new challenge. Attackers can speculate the users' sensitive location information according to a large number of users' history location data. Our future work will address the location privacy protection under big data concerns.
The arrival of the 5G will promote the rapid development of Internet of things (IoT), and location information is one of the basic elements of IoT perception information, also is the premise that IoT provide LBS. Location privacy protection of IoT has become one of the hot research areas. Research on the Internet of things in the localization process, LBS, the location privacy leakage ways and the corresponding location privacy protection mechanisms are of great significance. ZHIHONG BAI received the B.S. degree in information security from Northeastern University, Shenyang, China, in 2015, where he is currently pursuing the M.S. degree in software engineering.
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